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  Among the activists of the money market, banks as the most important financial institutions 
undertake an important role in optimal appropriation of financial short-term resources.   
Furthermore, they allocate the short-term surplus funds to enterprises, which have a short-term 
need.  Holding a main part of the funds in economy circulation, banks have a critical role in 
adjustment of economic relations. Banks are facing different types of risks in their daily 
operations. In the banking system, the CAMELS indictors are used to evaluate and rate of the 
performance of banks. The CAMELS rating model is one of the most effective systems of 
financial assessment in banks. Therefore, in this research, the effects of CAMELS indicators of 
banks on risk taking of Iranian banks are studied. The statistical population of the national 
banking system includes all governmental and private banks. The whole statistical population is 
studied as a research sample during 2006-2011. Taking into consideration the fact that the 
research data or section-bounded and time-bounded, a combinational regression analysis has 
been used. The results of the combinational regression analysis have supported the presence of 
a reverse and meaningful effect of the indicators of assets quality and sensitivity of market risk 
on risk taking in national banks. In addition, the results have supported the direct and 
meaningful effects of capital sufficiency and quality of profit-making on risk taking, however, 
the effects of the indicators of management quality and liquidity quality on risk taking have 
been rejected.  
         © 2013 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
Banking industry has been considered as the most important financial institutions undertake an 
important role in optimal appropriation of financial short-term resources (Khan, 1997; Al-Jarhi & 
Iqbal, 2001). According to Dang (2011) banking supervision has become important because of 
significant loan losses and bank failures from the 1980s till now. CAMEL is one of the most 
important tools for investigating the safety and soundness of banks, and helps mitigate the potential 
risks, which could lead to bank failures.    1176
Dang (2011) performed an empirical study of American International Assurance Vietnam (AIA) 
where the primary objective was to determine whether the CAMEL framework played a essential role 
in banking supervision or not. The study also identified the advantage as well as drawbacks, which 
the CAMEL system brings to AIA. The results concluded that CAMEL rating system was a useful 
supervisory tool in the U.S and CAMEL analysis method was beneficial as it is an internationally 
standardized rating and provided flexibility between on-site and off-site examination. Therefore, it 
was the primary model in evaluating banks’ performance in AIA.  
Babar and Zeb (2011) in an investigation investigated CAMEL rating system for banking industry in 
Pakistan and tried to find whether CAMELS system provide similar rating as PACRA system in 
assessing the performance of banks in Pakistan or not. According to Sarker (2005), Islamic banking 
as a new paradigm started in Bangladesh in 1983 and within  few months, 6 more banks were built in 
that country and there has been a growing concerns on the goal of Islamic Shariah. Sarker (2005) 
investigated and made  some recommendations on the more pertinent of some controversial issues on 
Islamic banking and suggested that micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) should get 
priority in the investment  decisions of the Islamic banks.  
Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) investigated on how bank provisioning behavior was associated with 
the business cycle, using 8000 bank-year data from 29 OECD countries over the past decade. 
Provisioning turned out to be substantially higher when GDP growth is lower, indicating increased 
riskiness of the credit portfolio when the business cycle turns downwards, which also increased the 
risk of a credit crunch. This effect was mitigated somewhat as provisions rise in times when earnings 
were higher, implying income smoothing, and loan growth was higher, indicating increased riskiness. 
According to Gorton (2009), “the credit crisis was sparked by a shock to fundamentals, housing 
prices failed to rise, which led to a collapse of trust in credit markets. In particular, the repurchase 
agreement market in the U.S., estimated to be about $12 trillion, larger than the total assets in the 
U.S. banking system ($10 trillion), became very illiquid during the crisis due to the fear of 
counterparty default, leaving lenders with illiquid bonds that they did not want, believing that they 
could not be sold. As a result, there was an increase in repo haircuts (the initial margin), causing 
massive deleveraging.” Gorton (2009) studied this indirectly, by studying at the breakdown in the 
arbitrage foundation of the ABX.HE indices during the panic. They reported that when the ABX 
prices plummeted, the arbitrage relationships linking the credit derivatives linked to the index and the 
underlying bonds broke down because liquidity evaporated in the repo market.  
Sinkey and Greenawalt (1991) performed a regression analysis and reported that loan-loss rates in 
1987 were positively associated with loan rates, volatile funds, and loan volume from the preceding 
three years. Palvia et al. (2009) exploited a large panel of U.S. commercial banks to investigate the 
association between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairperson gender and bank risk-taking  
during the recent financial crisis. They postulated that female executives could constrain excessive 
risk-taking in commercial banks, and could thereby reduce default risk during periods of market 
stress. Their results also indicated that banks with female CEOs were more conservative and could 
hold higher levels of equity capital. The positive relationship between female CEOs and capital ratios 
was strongest in smaller banks, and weak or non-existent in larger banks.  
Victoravich et al. (2011) investigated whether bank risk was a factor impacted by chief executive 
officer (CEO) power and equity incentives and the interaction between these factors over the period 
2005-2009, which marked the unraveling of the financial crisis. CEO power was measured with an 
index, including five underlying variables such as CEO duality, a staggered board of directors, etc. 
They found that firm specific risk was decreasing with CEO power and equity incentives in the form 
of CEO equity compensation  and future firm wealth. The findings recommended that when a CEO 
had more power, they could impact the board’s decision-making to their benefit in reducing risk. 
They also detected that CEOs with more power took on higher levels of firm risk when they had M. Khodaei Valahzaghard and S.Jabbari/ Management Science Letters 3 (2013) 
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greater levels of future firm wealth in the form of unexercisable options. Berger and Udell (2004) 
examined a new hypothesis that could help describe the procyclicality of bank lending. They tested 
this hypothesis and the results supported the hypothesis, although there were differences by bank size 
class. Laeven and Levine (2009) conducted the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk 
taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. They reported that the 
same regulation had different influences on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate 
governance structure. 
2. The proposed study 
The CAMELS rating model is one of the most effective systems of financial assessment in banks. 
Therefore, in this research, the effects of CAMELS indicators of banks on risk taking of Iranian 
banks are studied. The statistical population of the national banking system includes all governmental 
and private banks. The whole statistical population is studied as a research sample during 2006-2011. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the research data or section-bounded and time-bounded, a 
combinational regression analysis has been used. The proposed model of this paper uses the 
following model, 
RTi,t = β0 + β1CAi,t + β2AQi,t + β3MQi,t + β4EQi,t + β5LQi,t + β6SMi,t + εi,t,   (1)  
where  RTi,t  is risk taking, CAi,t  represents capital adequacy, AQi,t  shows asset quality, MQi,t  is 
management quality, EQi,t shows earning quality, LQi,t demonstrates liquidity quality, SMi,t represents 
sensitivity market and finally ɛi,t is the residuals. In this survey, to measure risk taking, Z-score is used 
where Z = (ROA + CAP)/σROA and here ROA represents return of assets, CAP shows the ratio of 
capital to total assets and σROA shows standard deviation of ROA. Table 1 shows some of the basic 
statistics associated with the proposed study of this paper. 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
N  Mean  Std. Deviation  Variance    Skewness  Kurtosis 
Statistic  Statistic  Statistic  Statistic    Statistic  Std. Error  Statistic  Std. Error 
RT  105  13.389  9.254   85.645     1.164   4.939   1.127   2.411  
CA  105  0.109  0.119   0.014     2.871   12.180   8.539   18.273  
AQ  105  14.491  6.882   47.367     -0.019   -0.082   -0.404   -0.864  
MQ  105  0.851  0.519   0.269     2.325   9.862   5.762   12.330  
EQ  105  0.469  0.229   0.052     1.411   5.986   2.052   4.392  
LQ  105  0.524  0.130  0.017     -0.194   -0.824   2.247    4.808  
SM  105  13.642  8.795  77.344     0.561   2.378   -0.167   -0.358  
 
The results of Table present the implementation of three tests including Kolmogorev-Smirnov, 
Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque- bera tests. Based on the results of Table 2, we may assume that most 
independent variables are normally distributed.  
Table 2 
The results of Kolmogorev-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk and Jarque- bera tests 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov   Shapiro-Wilk   Jarque- bera test        
Statistics   Level of significance   Statistics   Level of significance   Statistics   Level of significance   N     
.274   .000   .604   .000   422.3392   0.000000   105    CA 
.078   .120   .979   .100   0.859319   0.650731   105   AQ 
.230   .000   .700   .000   221.3878   0.000000   105   MQ 
.156   .000   .882   .000   49.10603   0.000000   105   EQ 
.087   .049   .961   .004   19.86938   0.000048   105   LQ 
.064   .200   .964   0.006   5.545340   0.062495   105   SM 
 
In addition, we need to whether we need to choose pooled or panel data and Table 3 shows the results 
of our survey.   1178
Table 3 
The results of Chow and Hausman tests 
 Chow          Hausman     
 F-statistics  Sig,  Chi-square  Sig. Results  Chi-Square  Error  level   
Pooled  0.249478    0.9391   1.398981   0.9244   Equal intercept       
Panel 27.20128  0.0000  212.15228  0.0000  Unequal  slope  12.512864  0.0515  Fixed  effect 
 
In addition, the results of F-statistics given in Table 4 indicate that we can assume a linear 
relationship and the result of Durbin-Watson shows that there is no auto correlation among residuals.  
Table 4 
The results of statistical tests 
  Linear relationship  Durbin-Watson  Residual test 
Model F-statistics  Sig.  Obtained  Desired  J_B  P-Value 
1  26.89926   0.000000   1.557797   1.5-2.5  220.6803   0.000000  
 
Finally, we need to make sure there are no strong correlations among independent variables and 
Table 5 summarizes the results of our survey. 
Table 5 
The results of correlations among dependent variables 
SM   LQ   EQ   MQ   AQ   CA     
-.534   .335   -.349   .323   -.744   1    CA 
.554   -.304   .202   -.399   1   -0.704   AQ 
-.064   .214   .282   1   -.399   0.323   MQ 
.661   .305   1   .282   .202   -0.349   EQ 
.197   1   .305   .214   -.304   0.335   LQ 
1   .197   .661   -.064   .554   -0.534   SM 
 
Based on the results of Table 5, we could make sure that there are no strong correlations among 
independent variables.  
3. The results  
 
In this section, we present details of our findings on testing different hypotheses of this survey based 
on the implementation of regression analysis on Eq. (1). Table 6 summarizes the results of our survey 
on regression analysis.  
  
Table 6 
The summary of regression analysis 
Par. Variable  Description  Coefficient Std.  error  t-student  P-value 
β0   c  Constant  17.05538 2.009526 8.487266   0.0000
β1 CA  Capital  adequacy  27.17168  9.867962  2.753524  0.0073  
β2  AQ  Asset quality  -0.089902   0.043996   -2.043416   0.0443  
β3 MQ  Management  quality  -0.520255 1.224855 -0.424748  0.6722
β4  EQ  Earning quality  3.453903   1.840086   1.877034   0.0642  
β5 LQ  Liquidity  quality  -6.186266  6.256310  -0.988804  0.3258  
β6  SM  Sensitivity market  -0.241522   0.062409   -3.869968   0.0002  
 
Important statistical tests including R-Square, F-value and Durbin-Watson are 0.89, 26.9 and 1.56, 
respectively. These results confirm the regression analysis and we can rely on the coefficients.  
3.1. Testing the first hypothesis: The relationship between CAMELS and RT 
Since RT is the dependent variable in Eq. (1), we verify the following hypotheses, 
0 C AA QM QE QL QS M
1 C AA QM QE QL QS M
:,,, , , 0
:,,, , , 0
H
H


  
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Since the coefficients of four variables, CA, AQ, EQ and SM are statistically significance with 
α=0.05, we may somehow confirm the main hypothesis of this survey. There are also six sub-
hypothesis associated with the proposed study of this paper, which are investigated accordingly. Note 
that the null hypothesis for all sub-hypotheses is that there is no relationship between the independent 
variable and dependent variable (RT) and the alternative hypothesis states the opposite one.  
3.1.1. The first sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and CA 
The first sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and CA. 
The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows, 

0,
1,
:0
    27.1716,   2.753,   , 2.753 1.96,2.58 , .0073
:0
CA RT
ob c
CA RT
H
Tt t p
H



           
   
The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is statistically significance with α=0.05. 
Therefore, the first sub-hypothesis is confirmed.  
3.1.2. The second sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and AQ 
The second sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and 
AQ. The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows, 

0,
1,
:0
    -0.0899,   -2.0434,   , -2.0434 1.96,2.58 , .0443
:0
AQ RT
ob c
AQ RT
H
Tt t p
H



           
   
The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is statistically significance with α=0.05. 
Therefore, the second sub-hypothesis is accepted.  
3.1.3. The second sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and MQ 
The third sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and 
MQ. The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows, 

0,
1,
:0
    -0.5202,   -0.4247,   , -0.4247 1.96,2.58 , .6722
:0
MQ RT
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MQ RT
H
Tt t p
H



           
   
The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is not statistically significance with α=0.05. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted, which means there is no relationship between management 
quality and risk taking.   
3.1.4. The fourth sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and EQ 
The fourth sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and 
EQ. The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows, 

0,
1,
:0
    3.4539,   1.8770,   ,1.8770 1.96,2.58 , .0642
:0
EQ RT
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
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The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is statistically significance only with α=0.10. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, which means there is a meaningful relationship between 
earning quality and risk taking.   
3.1.5. The fifth sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and LQ 
The fifth sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and LQ. 
The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows,   1180

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The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is not statistically significance with α=0.05. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted, which means there is not any meaningful relationship 
between liquidity quality and risk taking.    
3.1.6. The sixth sub-hypothesis: the relationship between RT and SM 
The fifth sub-hypothesis considers whether there is any meaningful relationship between RA and LQ. 
The result of testing this hypothesis is as follows, 

0,
1,
:0
    -0.2415,   -3.8699,   ,-3.8699 1.96,2.58 , .0002
:0
SM RT
ob c
SM RT
H
Tt t p
H



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The result of t-student indicates that the relationship is statistically significance with α=0.05. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, which means there is a meaningful relationship between 
sensitivity management and risk taking.    
4. Conclusion 
In this survey, we have investigated the relationship between CAMELS index and risk taking. The 
study also considered the relationship between risk taking and six independent variables including 
capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning quality, liquidity quality and sensitivity 
market. The results of this survey have confirmed the main hypothesis. We hope the results of this 
survey could help banking industry to make better managerial decisions.   
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